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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS -
AN OVERVIEW OF NEW CASES, 
LEGISLATION & REGULATIONS AFFECTING
THE OIL & GAS INDUSTRY
Thomas A. Daily
Rec ent  d ev el opm en ts  - an  overview
OF NEW CASES, LEGISLATION &  REGULATION AFFECTING THE 
NATURAL RESOURCE INDUSTRIES
Thom as  A. Da i l y 1
U. S. Di s tr ic t  Cour t  Fin d s  Li ab il it y , Det er min e s  Sev er a l  
Iss ue s  in  Min er a l  Tre spass  Case  In vol vin g  Brin e  Wa te rf lo od
The case of Deltic Timber Corp. v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp.2 represents another 
round in the continuing legal fight between South Arkansas chemical companies and their royalty 
owners. This battle has already lasted long enough to have been discussed in papers presented at 
the two previous Natural Resources Law Institutes.3 Great Lakes and its competitor, Albemarle 
Corporation4, extract elemental bromine from brine which they produce from high volume wells 
drilled into the Reynolds Aquifer of the Smackover Limestone Formation underlying Columbia 
and Union Counties, Arkansas. One of the biggest land and royalty owners in Union County is 
Deltic Timber Corporation, a successor to a subsidiary of Murphy Oil Corporation.
Deltic sued Great Lakes alleging that Great Lakes’ brine production and injection 
operations had wrongfully displaced bromine-rich brine from beneath Deltic’s lands, leaving in its 
place debrominated “tail brine” (produced brine that Great Lakes reinjects into the geologic 
formation after its elemental bromine is removed by chemical reaction). Great Lakes had failed to
1With considerable assistance from others including, without limitation, Tim Dowd and 
John Dexter of Oklahoma City and Frank Patton, W. S. Walker and Leigh Chiles of Fort Smith.
22 F. Supp.2d 1192 (W.D. Ark. 1998).
3Daily, Recent Developments in Natural Law - Circa 1996, 1997 Ar k a n s a s  Na t u r a l  
Re s o u r c e s  La w  In s t i t u t e ; Daily, Recent Developments - A Review o f Cases, Legislation and 
Regulations Affecting the Natural Resources Industries, 1998 ARKANSAS NATURAL RESOURCES 
La w  In s t i t u t e .
4Albemarle is the successor to Ethyl Corporation.
secure brine leases covering all of Deltic’s lands within the vicinity of Great Lakes’ operation but, 
with a few exceptions, did hold leases on Deltic’s lands lying directly between injection and 
production wells. Deltic claimed compensatory and punitive damages of more than 
$100,000,000. The United States district judge5 ruled in favor of Deltic, in part, awarding 
compensatory damages of about $415,000.
The case is the fourth in which a plaintiff has claimed subterranean injury resulting from a 
brine producer’s recycling operations. The first such case was Budd v. Ethyl Corp.6 7In that case 
the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld dismissal of Budd’s complaint which involved two tracts of 
land. As to the first tract, which lay near, but outside, Ethyl’s cluster of injection and production 
wells (“recycling area”), the court refused to find liability, ruling that the law of capture applied. 
Budd’s second tract lay within Ethyl’s recycling area, but he owned only a mineral leasehold 
interest in that tract, as opposed to a fee interest. The court denied recovery for damage to that 
tract because this limited interest did not provide standing to sue.
In Young v. Ethyl Corp.7, the Eighth Circuit held that Ethyl was liable to Young, whose 
unleased lands lay within Ethyl’s recycling area. That court noted the different rationale applied 
by the Arkansas court to Budd’s two tracts which, it reasoned, would have been unnecessary had 
the law of capture applied within the recycling area. In Jameson v. Ethyl Corp.8, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court adopted the Eighth Circuit’s ruling in Young. In that decision the Arkansas court
5Hon. Harry Barnes.
6251 Ark. 639, 474 S.W.2d 414 (1971).
7521 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1975).
8271 Ark 621, 609 S.W.2d 346 (1980).
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held that Ethyl was liable for injury to Jameson’s lands lying within its recycling area.
In Deltic Great Lakes had argued that Budd precluded liability for injury to Deltic’s lands 
lying outside Great Lakes’ recycling area (defined by Great Lakes as the area directly between its 
lines o f injection and production wells). The district court held otherwise, ruling that since Great 
Lakes’ production wells would produce significant amounts of brine which originated outside its 
recycling area, and since that production would be enhanced by the increase in differential 
pressure caused by injection of tail brine, Great Lakes was liable for injury to those lands, as well 
as to Deltic’s few tracts which lay between injection and production wells.
The court then held that Great Lakes’ injury to the Deltic lands lying outside the recycling 
area was not committed in bad faith since Great Lakes had relied in good faith upon its 
interpretation of Budd. The court awarded Deltic three years’ royalty for those lands.9 The 
Eighth Circuit had previously affirmed the district court’s summary judgment ruling barring 
Deltic from recovering any damages sustained outside the three-year period of limitations.10
In applying the “royalty” measure of damages for good faith trespass the court followed 
Killam v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp.11, which makes Arkansas the only modem jurisdiction which has
9The chemical industry has customarily paid “in lieu” royalties, on a per acre basis, rather 
than a fraction of production of the value of actual production. This is, in large part, because of 
the difficulty of valuing brine, a mineral which is worthless unless it contains minerals which can 
and will be extracted. A.C.A. § codified this in lieu royalty, establishing a minimum which, 
because it exceeds the true market value of the brine, has served as the standard in lieu royalty 
paid throughout South Arkansas. Judge Barnes based good faith damages upon this statutory in 
lieu royalty.
l0Deltic Farm and Timber Co. v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp., 120 F.3d 854 (8th Cir.
1997).
11303 Ark. 547, 798 S.W.2d 419.
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sanctioned the award of royalty, rather than the in-ground value of the mineral taken, under 
circumstances where the plaintiff would not have produced the mineral on its own.
Judge Barnes found that Great Lakes had acted in bad faith with respect to the few 
unleased Deltic tracts lying within its recycling area. He computed bad faith damages based upon 
the value of brine at the wellhead without allowance for lifting costs. Deltic had unsuccessfully 
argued that bad faith damages should be based upon the value of bromine extracted from the brine 
without allowance for either lifting costs or for the cost of extracting the brine.
In an earlier summary judgment ruling, which is not discussed in his opinion, Judge Barnes 
had ruled that since the bad faith measure of damages is inherently punitive in nature, Deltic was 
precluded from receiving additional punitive damages.
Finally, Judge Barnes refused to award pre-judgment interest to Deltic. Under Arkansas 
law pre-judgment interest may be recovered on claims which are liquidated or which are 
ascertainable by fixed standards. The court noted that the parties presented conflicting competent 
evidence of which Deltic tracts had been adversely impacted by Great Lakes’ operations, the 
extent of that adverse impact, and the value of the brine displaced. Thus, it found that an award 
of pre-judgment interest would be improper.
This was big time, big cost litigation.12 It featured high-tech movie presentations of 
computer reservoir simulators estimating the effect of the displacement. Highly credentialed 
economists grappled with the problem of valuing the brine while earning hourly rates which rival 
the weekly take-home pay of many Arkansans.
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12Deltic actually requested an award of costs in an amount exceeding its award of 
damages, most of which was denied.
Also noteworthy was Great Lakes’ proof of the underlying facts of Budd, Young and 
Jameson. Those cases all involved Ethyl Corporation’s Kerlin brine field. The lands owned by 
Budd, Young and Jameson are not far apart. Their precise relationship to Ethyl’s recycling area 
was established by Great Lakes’ testimony and exhibits in the Deltic trial. The appellate opinions 
in those cases become much clearer when augmented by such proof. That proof is now a part of 
the record in Deltic.
Both parties have appealed. Great Lakes urges error in the finding of liability outside its 
recycling area based upon its interpretation of Budd, Young and Jameson. It relies largely upon 
the underlying facts of those cases which it proved at the trial. Deltic urges that Judge Barnes’ 
findings o f fact relating to good faith rather than bad faith liability, and the amount of both good 
faith and bad faith damages are clearly erroneous. Deltic did not appeal from Judge Barnes ruling 
that punitive damages could not be recovered in combination with bad faith damages. The appeal 
has been briefed and awaits oral argument. This is the third chapter of this author’s report on the 
brine wars. At minimum there will be a fourth.
Ok l a h o m a  Co u r t  o f  Appe a l s  Ru l e s  Th a t  Le s s e e ’s  Co n d u c t  
Ma y  Ex c u s e  De m a n d  t o  Ma r k e t  Ga s
Hill Resources drilled two gas wells, the Drummond 31-1 and Drummond 32-1 in 1979 
and 1980, respectively. Neither well is capable of open flow exceeding 100 MCF per day. Hill 
never connected either well but claimed that, notwithstanding its failure to do so for 14 to 15 
years, its leases were validly held by production. In 1994 Noel Nally took top leases and, along 
with his lessors, sued to terminate Hill’s leases. Nally argued, in the alternative, that neither 
Drummond Well was capable of commercial production and that Hill had egregiously breached
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the implied covenant to market gas. Most of Nally’s lessors had made demand upon Hill to 
connect the wells and market the gas, but only immediately prior to filing suit.
The district judge13 voided Hill’s leases for violation of the implied covenant to market.
He held that Nally’s lessors were excused from making additional demands to market when Hill’s 
response to those lessors who did make demand was “meager at best and only for appearances”. 
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals affirmed.14 This result is similar to that in the Arkansas case of 
Byrd v. Bradham ,15 In both states, demand to comply with an implied covenant is generally a 
prerequisite to a lease cancellation. However, there are exceptions to that general rule. It is 
possible for a lessee to conduct itself so badly that demand will not be necessary.16
The result is correct. However, it is submitted that the district judge should also have held 
that Hill’s leases had expired, since neither Drummond well is capable of producing gas in paying 
quantities. In calculating paying quantities he excluded pipeline hookup costs, even though 
undisputed testimony established that neither well was likely to ever recover the cost of 
connecting it to market. Of course, there are lots of cases holding that drilling, completion and 
hookup costs are not to be included in the arithmetic of determining a well’s commerciality.17
13Hon. Ted Knight.
14Roslyn Crain, et al v. Hill Resources, Inc., et a l,___P2d___ , (Okla. App. 1998), cert
denied____P2d____ (Okla. 1998).
15280 Ark. 11, 655 S.W.2d 366 (1983).
l6Id
11See Daily, And For So Long Thereafter. . . “Paying Quantities”, “Shutting-in”, and 
other Legal Problems o f the Secondary Term, 1991 Ar k a n s a s  N a t u r a l  Re s o u r c e s  La w  
In s t i t u t e , for a general discussion of the perpetuation of oil and gas leases by operation of the 
habendum clause.
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However, in each of those cases the costs in question had already been incurred. The correct test 
should include all reasonably expected future costs but should exclude past (sunk) costs. That 
result was reached in at least one Federal diversity case from Western Oklahoma.18 The 
hypothetical prudent operator certainly considers all future costs in determining whether to keep 
or plug his well. Indeed, the likely inability of the Drummond Wells to recover their hookup cost 
was the very reason that Hill failed to market gas from the wells.
Ro y a l t y  Ow n e r  Cl a s s  Ce r t i f i c a t i o n  Ca s e s  Yi e l d  In c o n s i s t e n t  Re s u l t s
The author expects that the paper presented at this institute by Mr. Tom Marrs will 
thoroughly discuss Hales v. SEECO, a case in which Mr. Marrs was lead counsel for the 
defendants. That discussion will be left to Mr. Marrs. However, Hales wasn’t the only royalty 
owner class action in the ArkLaTex region in 1998. There were at least one Texas and two 
Oklahoma interlocutory appeals of decisions involving class certification. The Texas case was 
Tana Oil and Gas Corporation v. Bates.19 It involved allegations that the defendant had failed to 
market gas for the best available terms and had improperly deducted certain post-production 
costs. Class certification was affirmed over the arguments of the defendant that there were many 
individualized fact distinctions between class members. Indeed, the various class members had 
executed different leases with different royalty clauses, but the court ruled that these differences 
were irrelevant.
The Oklahoma cases reached opposite results. In Greghol Limited Partnership v. Oryx
18 Slats Honeymon Drilling Co. v. Union Oil Co. O f Cal., 239 F.Supp. 585 (W.D. 
Okla. 1965).
19978 S.W. 2d. 735 (Tex. App. 1998).
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Energy Company20, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals upheld certification of a class of certain 
allegedly improper post production costs to royalty and overriding royalty owners. The district 
judge certified a class of plaintiffs over claims by the defendant that individual questions 
predominated. The Court of Appeals affirmed the certification.
However, in Mayo v. Kaiser-Francis Oil Co.21, another division of the Oklahoma Court of 
Appeals affirmed denial of class certification by the same district judge22 in a very similar case. In 
Mayo the plaintiffs alleged that Kaiser-Francis had marketed gas to an affiliate company and then 
resold it at a higher price as part of a scheme to cheat royalty owners. The complaint is 
apparently confusing. It sought to obtain class certification for “all mineral owners”. The court 
held that since Kaiser-Francis was not in privity with owners who were not its own lessors, there 
was not sufficient commonality to certify the class. The dissenting opinion correctly points out 
that in Oklahoma, like in Arkansas, all royalty owners draw from a pool based upon all gas sales. 
Therefore, lack of contractual privity was irrelevant. It is likely that the Mayo plaintiffs’ failure 
to articulate this argument contributed more than anything to this incorrect decision.
Mayo highlights another trend -- one that is somewhat disturbing. Appellate courts are 
tiring of interlocutory appeals of class certification decisions. They are beginning to summarily 
affirm those rulings without giving adequate thought to the issues.
20959 P. 2d 596 (Okla. App. 1998).
21962 P.2d 657 (Okla. App. 1998).
22Hon. James Winchester.
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Ok l a h o m a  Co u r t  Re s o l v e s  De d u c t i b i l i t y  o f  Po s t -Pr o d u c t i o n  Co s t s
M ittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc.23 was a case on certification from the Tenth Circuit 
Court o f Appeals to the Oklahoma Supreme Court which involved the deductibility of post-
production costs from royalties. The court’s well-reasoned opinion held that the implied duty to 
market gas implied a duty to make the gas into a marketable product free of cost. Therefore, such 
costs as well-head compression and dehydration are not deductible. However, once the gas 
becomes a marketable product, reasonable additional costs which actually enhance its value may 
be charged proportionately against the royalty interest. Thus, reasonable off-site gathering and 
transportation charges may be deducted.
The Arkansas Supreme Court could adopt the M ittelstaedt standard for Arkansas without 
overruling Hanna Oil and Gas Company v. Taylor24, because that case disallowed only deduction 
of well-head compression costs. It should be urged to do so at the first opportunity.
In a companion case, XAE Corporation v. SMR Property Management25 the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court held that since no implied covenants were owed to an in-kind overriding royalty 
interest owner, all reasonable post-production costs were properly chargeable against the override 
owner who elected to let the operator sell its in-kind production. That ruling makes sense since 
M ittlestaedt’s rationale is rooted in the implied covenant to market gas.
23954 P.2d 1203 (Okla. 1998).
24297 Ark. 80, 759 S.W.2d 563 (1988).
251998 WL 313562 (Okla. No. 87, 466) (June 9, 1998).
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Ok l a h o m a  Cou rt  Appr o v e s  Ca s h  Ba l a n c in g  Or d e r  
Wh e n  Pr o o f  Es t a b l is h e s  Th a t  Re m a i n i n g  Re s e r v e s  
Ar e  In s u f f i c i e n t  To  Pe r m i t  Ba l a n c in g  i n  Kin d
Harrell v. Samson Resources Company26 involved a claim for cash balancing prior to 
depletion of a well in the absence of a gas balancing agreement. The plaintiff proved that the 
remaining reserves in the well were insufficient to permit balancing in kind. Samson argued that 
the statute of limitations began to accrue with the overproduction and that, since that was over 
ten years before suit was filed, Harrell’s cause of action was barred by limitations. It also argued 
that no cash balancing should be ordered until depletion of the well.
The district court ordered cash balancing and awarded prejudgment interest from the date 
of the first overproduction. It also awarded an attorneys fee to Harrell. The Oklahoma Court of 
Appeals reversed based upon Sampson’s statute of limitation argument. The Oklahoma Supreme 
court granted certiorari and then reinstated that part of the trial court’s ruling that had ordered 
cash balancing. The Supreme Court permitted prejudgment interest only from the date that 
demand for cash balancing was made and disallowed the attorney’s fee altogether.
The critical fact in this case is that the preferred remedy of balancing in-kind could not be 
accomplished. It would thus be pointless to require Harrell to wait until depletion of the well to 
be reimbursed for the gas which Samson had overproduced.
Since the unit JOA creates a co-tenant like relationship, limitations does not begin to run 
until violation by one co-tenant of the other’s right. That had occurred when Samson recently 
tried to sell its interest in the well without offering to pay for its overproduction.
261998 WL 381297 (Okla No. 82139) (July 7, 1998).
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Te x a s  Cour t  o f  Appe a l s  Uses  Fo r c e  Ma j e u r e  
Cl a u s e  t o  Sa v e  Lease  Wh e n  Pi pe l in e  Re c o n s t r u c t io n  
Pr e c l u d e s  Ma r k e t i n g  o f  Gas  For  Ex t e nd e d  Pe r io d
In Texas, unlike Oklahoma, actual marketing o f oil or gas is required to perpetuate a lease 
under its habendum clause. In the case o f  Sun Operating Limited Partnership v. Holt27 the Texas 
Court o f  Appeals dealt with a situation where sales were prevented for a period longer than 
permitted by the cessation o f  production clause in an oil and gas lease by pipeline repairs. The 
court refused to affirm a decree voiding the lease. It held that a force majeure clause which 
excused production during certain events including “failure o f  carrier to transport” prevented the 
forfeiture. The opinion doesn’t say why the operator didn’t just pay shut-in royalty. It seems that 
would have been much simpler.
Fi f t h  Cir c u it  Un -sc re w s  Up Mis si s s ip pi  
Law  Re g a r d in g  Ro y a l t i e s  on  
No n r e c o up a b l e  Ta k e -or -Pay  Se t t l e m e n t
Most jurisdictions, including Oklahoma28 and Texas29, have ruled that royalty owners are 
not entitled to share in nonrecoupable take-or-pay settlements. Unfortunately, the Finkelstein 
case which led to the Texas ruling originally reached an opposite result but was reversed on 
rehearing. That led to the comedy o f errors in Mississippi known as Williamson v. E lf Aquitaine, 
Inc. Williamson was first decided by a federal district court predicting Mississippi law. Noting 
that Mississippi had no case in point and that Mississippi state courts often adopted Texas rulings 
in mineral law cases, the district court held, based upon the original Finkelstein opinion, that
27___ S.W .2d____(Tex. App. 1998).
2SRoye Realty v. Watson, 949 P.2d. 1208 (1996).
29TransAmerican Natural G as Corp. v. Finkelstein, 933 S.W. 2d. 591 (1996).
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Mississippi royalty owners were entitled to share in nonrecoupable take-or-pay settlements just as 
were Texas royalty owners.30 Unfortunately, the Texas court then changed its mind, to the 
embarrassment o f the Mississippi district court judge. Fortunately, there was still time to appeal 
to the Fifth Circuit which reversed the district court and applied real Texas law.31
En  Ba n c  Tenth  Circ ui t  Refu ses  to  Vacate  Opini o n  
Hol ding  Tha t  Ind ia n  La n d s  Pate n t  whic h  Reserved  
Co a l  Al s o  Res er v ed  Co a l -Be d  Metha n e
This author’s contribution to the 1998 Natural Resources Law Institute noted that the 
Tenth Circuit Court o f Appeals had ruled, contrary to a United States’ Solicitor General’s 
opinion, that an Indian patent which reserved coal also reserved coal-bed methane. An en banc 
rehearing was granted but the full court upheld the panel decision.32 There are many identical 
Indian lands patents in Eastern Oklahoma. Since Oklahoma is in the Tenth Circuit, this decision is 
binding there.
1999 Arkans as  Gen er a l  As s em bl y  Pro ves  Tha t  
Term  Lim its  Do n ’t  Ma ke  a n y  Dif ference
Lock up your valuables, the Legislature is in session again. This year is the first after 
mandatory retirement o f many o f the “old guard”. Fear not. The legislative foolishness is as bad 
as ever. While much o f the fun centers around the usual topics,33 several bills are o f interest to the 
Natural Resources Industries.
30Williamson v. Elf Aquitaine, Inc., 925 F.Supp. 1163 (N.D. Miss. 1996).
31 Williamson v. Elf Aquitaine, Inc., 138 F. 3d 546 (1998).
32Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Production Co., 151 F.3d 1251 (1998).
33Such as prohibiting all forms o f abortion, cutting taxes on property and groceries, 
achieving gridlock with the Governor over the State’s miserable highways.
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In virtually every legislative session someone introduces a bill which would increase the 
severance tax on natural gas. Such a bill is almost certainly doomed to fail because tax increases 
(other than sales tax increases) require a super majority for enactment. It is thus important that 
Arkansas’ voters soundly defeated proposed Initiated Act No. 2, which would have allowed the 
Legislature to increase any tax by majority vote, in the 1998 general election.
House Bill 1018, sponsored by Representative Lendall, proposes to increase the gas 
severance tax from 3/10 o f  one cent per MCF to 5% o f market value. This bill drew instant 
opposition and was quickly pulled by its sponsor. However, polls show that the people o f  
Arkansas want reduced property taxes. When that happens the lost revenue must be made up 
somewhere. Most o f  the state doesn’t care what the severance tax is. Look for more efforts to 
increase it.
Senate Bill 30, sponsored by Senator Mahoney, is the proposed Revised Administrative 
Procedure Act. This bill, an outgrowth o f the discontent o f the Legislature for certain state 
agencies,34 would drastically and adversely impact the Oil and Gas Commission. Embedded in the 
bill are some good ideas, such as an express prohibition o f ex parte communications with the 
agency and its hearing officer, and rules designed to prevent an agency’s staff from confusing the 
roles o f  advocate and judge.
Unfortunately, the negative aspects o f this proposal outweigh any positive aspects. Both 
the rule-making and adjudicatory processes are made so complicated that the Oil and Gas 
Commission will likely be paralyzed. Also, it is inadvertently drafted in such a way that William 
Wynne, present Commission contract counsel and hearing officer, would be disqualified from the
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34Reportedly the Fish and Game and Highway Commissions.
latter role. The Oil and Gas Commission officially opposes this bill, at least if that agency is not 
expressly exempted from its application. The industry should as well. As o f February 10, 1999, it 
was still in the Senate Committee on State Agencies and Governmental Affairs.
For almost two years two state agencies—the Oil and Gas Commission and the Public 
Service Commission—have sought to exercise conflicting jurisdiction over natural gas production 
and gathering facilities located upstream from the custody transfer meter.35 The Natural 
Resources Industries should support the Oil and Gas Commission in this fuss. That agency has a 
far better understanding o f realities o f the gas business than does the other, a body whose 
expertise is mostly in the area o f utility rates. A bill has been prepared to resolve the jurisdictional 
dispute in favor o f the Oil and Gas Commission. As o f February 10, 1999, it had not been filed 
and, therefore, it had no bill number to report. It will almost certainly be introduced into the 
Legislature before the presentation o f this paper.
Efficient administration o f the judicial branch of government is not uniquely a natural 
resources law issue. It is an issue affecting every citizen and certainly every taxpayer. The 
ancient and arcane Arkansas trial court system is severely in need of reform. This state simply 
doesn’t need separate equity and law courts. The successful operation o f Circuit/Chancery courts 
around the state have proven that beyond a reasonable doubt.
Also, the current system of partisan election o f trial judges is senseless and dangerous. Its 
primary effect has been to create a lot o f overnight Republican judicial candidates who have 
figured out how to avoid crowded Democratic Party primaries.
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35See the discussion o f this dispute in Daily, Recent Developments - A Review o f Cases, 
Legislation and Regulations Affecting the Natural Resources Industries, 1998 ARKANSAS 
Na t u r a l  Re s o u r c e s  La w  In s t i t u t e .
Senate Joint Resolution 9, Sponsored by Senator Beebe, proposes a constitutional 
amendment which would replace the judicial article o f the Arkansas Constitution with a new 
article drafted by a joint committee o f the Arkansas Bar Association and the Arkansas Judicial 
Council. If enacted it would give every general trial judge jurisdiction over both common law and 
equity cases without abolishing the other procedural distinctions between the two. It would also 
provide for non-partisan election o f all judges and prosecuting attorneys.
Every citizen o f this state should support the proposed new judicial article, both in the 
legislature and in the 2000 general election. Unfortunately, there is little assurance that it will 
succeed in the Legislature. The place is obsessed with property tax reform. SJR 9 is only one o f  
thirty-one proposed constitutional amendments filed in the legislature as o f February 10, 1999. 
Arkansas’ Constitution permits only three referred amendments per legislative session. The 
competition is stiff.
Loc al  Ord in an ce s  Com pli ca te  Li f e  In  t h e  Val ley , Raise  Leg al  Ques tions  
Millions o f years ago organic material was deposited on earth to eventually chemically 
decompose into natural gas. Much more recently human population increases have urbanized 
much o f the surface o f Western Arkansas which is underlain by the natural resources produced by 
all those rotted dinosaurs. Most o f the citizens own lots so small that they produce only token 
royalties. Even worse, many own no minerals at all as a result o f severance by former owners.
The mood o f the land doesn’t much favor gas drilling in the neighborhood. Cities, towns and 
tiny hamlets have started enacting local ordinances designed to regulate drilling within corporate 
limits. Fort Smith’s ordinance was first.36 It is not unreasonable, considering that Fort Smith is a
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36See Appendix I.
city o f about 75,000, deserving o f a certain amount o f land use regulation. The many wells within 
that city prove that the gas industry can live with this ordinance.
Unfortunately other towns have enacted ordinances which are clearly designed to keep gas 
wells out o f  town altogether. The towns o f Ozark, Branch and Ratcliff37 have produced virtually 
identical examples o f these onerous laws.38 At today’s prices, gas just isn’t worth all that hassle.
Recently a resident o f Van Buren proposed the mother o f all such ordinances to the city 
counsel o f that town.39 Several successful wells have been completed in Van Buren in the last few 
years. These trigger big royalty checks to substantial landowners including the town itself and its 
school district. Moreover, production facilities have been made almost invisible.40 That isn’t 
enough to dissuade the proponent o f the Van Buren ordinance who learned that one possible drill 
site was near a lot which he owned in the town. So far the Van Buren City Council has been cool 
to the proposal but the mayor, inexplicably, seems to favor it.
The Oil and Gas Commission opposes all such local regulation o f drilling. The 
Commission believes that it has exclusive jurisdiction in this area. In mid-98 its director sought a 
supportive opinion from the State Attorney General. He didn’t get one. The Attorney General 
opined that local bodies could enact such legislation if that legislation was related to protection o f
37The latter two are but spots along Arkansas Highway 22.
38See Appendix II.
39See Appendix III.
40Wellheads are placed below ground and are covered with steel plates. The minimal 
above ground equipment is well concealed. Because these wells are connected to a low pressure 
gas distribution line, it is unlikely that noisy compression will ever be needed.
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health and welfare and at was least as restrictive as state law.41 These local ordinances certainly 
meet the second criteria. Only litigation will determine whether they exceed the former.
Perhaps the solution lies in the legislature. A new state statute simply providing for 
exclusive Oil and Gas Commission regulatory jurisdiction would work, but such a bill is unlikely 
to be very popular with legislators or their constituents. Reasonable exclusive state legislation 
regulating urban drilling in a manner similar to the Fort Smith Ordinance might have a better 
chance. Such a statute could still grant exclusive enforcement jurisdiction to the Oil and Gas 




Appe n d ix  IV
Ar k a n s a s ’ Att or ney  Gener al  Opi ni o n  Re l a ti n g  t o  
Lo cal  Ordi na nc e  Re g ul ati on  Of  Gas  Dr il l in g
OPINION NO. 98-241
Opinion letter from Attorney General Winston Bryant 
to Honorable Ned R. Price, Chairman of the 
Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission
Dear Chairman Price:
You have requested an Attorney General opinion1 concerning certain municipal 
ordinances. You indicate that two cities of the second class in Arkansas have recently 
enacted ordinances that purport to restrict the mining and drilling of oil and gas wells 
within the city limits, and that require permits from the city to engage in such activities. 
The ordinances also impose penalties for violations. You note that these ordinances 
appear to conflict with the jurisdiction of the Oil and Gas Commission. Accordingly, you 
have asked:
Do cities of the second class have the authority to enact ordinances 
regulating the mining and drilling of oil and gas wells within the city limits?
It is my opinion that cities of the second class can enact ordinances regulating the 
mining and drilling of oil and gas wells within the city limits, but only if the ordinances 
do not conflict with state law or with any requirement of the Oil and Gas Commission, 
and only if the ordinances are not less significant than state law or any requirement of 
the Oil and Gas Commission.2
Cities of the second class are empowered to regulate matters related to municipal 
affairs (see A.C.A. § 14-42-307), including matters of public health, welfare and safety 
(see A.C.A. § 14-54-103 and -105), and including matters related to the regulation of 
the use of property within the city limits (see, e.g., A.C.A. § 14-54-501 ,-601, and -901 ; 
A.C.A § 14-56-301 ). These various grants of power to municipalities to regulate 
matters related to municipal affairs are broad enough to encompass regulations 
concerning oil and gas drilling.
1 Your opinion request was actually submitted by the Director of the Oil and Gas 
Commission pursuant to your direction. I have addressed my response to you rather 
than to the Director, in accordance with the requirements of A.C.A. § 25-16-706.
2 You have inquired about cities of the second class only. However, because the 
constitutional authority upon which my opinion is based is applicable to all 
municipalities, my conclusion would be the same with regard to cities of the first class 
and incorporated towns.
Nevertheless, these cities are prohibited by state law from enacting any ordinance that 
is inconsistent with or contrary to state law. Article 12, § 4 of the Arkansas Constitution 
states: “No municipal corporation shall be authorized to pass any law contrary to the 
general laws of the state . . .” Accord, A.C.A. §§ 14-42-307 (cities can exercise all 
powers conferred by state law that are “not contrary” to state law); 14-54-101 (cities 
can exercise powers that are “not inconsistent” with the general laws of the state); 
14-55-101 (cities can enact ordinances that are “not inconsistent with the laws of the 
state”).
State law grants the Oil and Gas Commission extensive and detailed authority to 
regulate matters relating to oil and gas drilling, including authority to grant permits for 
drilling and the authority to make rules and regulations governing the various aspects 
of such activities. For a detailed listing of the Commission’s powers and duties with 
regard to these matters, see A.C.A §15-71-110. State law also establishes numerous 
requirements regarding these matters and sets forth penalties for violations. See 15- 
72-101 e t  seq.
Because of the breadth and detailed extent of the regulatory power given to the Oil and 
Gas Commission by state law, it is my opinion that the primary authority to regulate in 
the field of oil and gas matters belong to the Commission. Accordingly, if a municipality 
exercises its regulatory powers pursuant to the statutes cited previously, it must do so 
in a manner that is consistent with the Commission’s authority. In my opinion, a local 
ordinance that is less stringent than the requirements of state law and the rules and 
regulations of the Commission would be inconsistent with and contrary to authority of 
the Commission. It would therefore be contrary to state law, and thus violative of the 
Arkansas Constitution.
However, a local ordinance that attempts to regulate oil and gas drilling through 
regulations and other requirements that are more stringent than state law would be 
constitutionally permissible (provided that the ordinance any and rules and regulations 
enacted thereunder are otherwise consistent with state law and the rules and 
regulations of the Commission.)
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that cities of the second class can enact 
ordinances that regulate the mining and drilling of oil and gas wells within the city limits, 
but only if the ordinances are consistent with state law and the rules and regulations of 
the Oil and Gas Commission, and only if the ordinances are not less stringent than 
state law or any requirement of the Oil and Gas Commission.
Assistant Attorney General Suzanne Antley prepared the foregoing opinion, which I 
hereby approve.
Sincerely
/s/ Winston Bryant
